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CoNSTITOTIONAL LA.w - CIVIL RIGHTS AcT - CIVIL L!ABn.1TY OF STA'I'B 
JumCIAL OFFICERS-In 1940 defendant, a state judge, granted an ex parte 
order transferring plaintiff, then a voluntary inmate of a Massachusetts school 
for the feeble-minded, to the Department of Defective Delinquents. Released 
on habeas corpus in 1951, plaintiff brought suit under the Civil Rights Act,1 
117 Stat. L. 13 (1871), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §43. 
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claiming a denial of notice and hearing in violation of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, held, a judge is not liable at 
common law or under the Civil Rights Act for acts done in the exercise of his 
judicial function. Francis 11. Crafts, (1st Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 809, cert. den. 
(U.S. 1953) 74 S. Ct. 43. 
At common law there was no civil liability for the acts of judges done in 
their official capacity.2 The English rule is that immunity exists if the proceeds 
are lawful and conducted with apparent regularity.3 The immunity is given 
to safeguard independence of action and freedom from harassment.4 One 
court has said the immunity "is absolutely essential to the very existence, in 
any valuable form, of the office itself ."5 Early federal decisions agreed that 
judges should receive judicial immunity.6 The possible exception in cases of 
malicious action was soon erased, 7 and immunity was extended to inferior 
courts even where the~e were acts in excess of jurisdiction. 8 It seems clear that 
the Fourteenth Amendment makes it possible for Congress to take this immunity 
from state judges if there is a violation of due process. The Supreme Court in 
:Ex parte Virginia9 declared that a state acts through its legislature, executive, 
and judiciary, and the Fourteenth Amendment allows federal review of state 
court decisions said to be in violation of the amendment.10 The language of 
the Civil Rights Act imposing civil liability on "every person who acts under 
the color of state law'' would seem to reach the judiciary.11 The Supreme Court 
has never answered this question. Faced with an opportunity to deal with the 
injunctive relief provisions of section 43 of the act in Stefanelli 11. Minard,12 
the Court said that the district court could refuse to act in its discretion, and 
so escaped the need to say whether an injunction, if granted, would be proper. 
Only three lower court decisions hold the judge liable under the act.13 Four-
2 Fray v. Blackburn, 3 B. & S. 576, 122 Eng. Rep. 217 (1863); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 
Wall. (80 U.S.) 335 (1871); Aluza v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 34 S.Ct. 27 (1913) 
(extending judicial immunity to the Philippines). 
s Usill v. Hales, 3 C.P.D. 319 (1878). 
4 Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 282 (1810). 
5 Grove, Jr. v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654 at 656 (1882). 
6 Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 523 (1868); Bradley v. Fisher, note 2 supra. 
Both deal with federal judges. 
7 Bradley v. Fisher, note 2 supra. 
SYaselli v. Goff, (2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 396, affd. per curiam 275 U.S. 503, 48 
S.Ct. 155 (1927). 
9 100 U.S. 339 (1879). See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1947). 
10 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1257(3); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 18 
S.Ct. 805 (1897); Shelley v. Kraemer, note 9 supra. 
11 8 U.S.C. (1946) §43; Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 
240. The court in Bottone v. Lindsley, (10th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 705, doubted that 
a private suit is under color of state law, adding the action must be a complete nullity for 
the Civil Rights Act to apply. 
12342 U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118 (1951). 
13 Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., note 11 supra; McShane v. Moldovan, (6th Cir. 
1949) 172 F. (2d) 1016; Cooper v. Hutchinson, (8th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 119. 
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teen cases have denied liability, but of these three involved federal judges,14 
two contained no reference to the Civil Rights Act,15 one said no federal question 
was raised for application of the act,16 one held that the action was properly 
brought under the act so as to vest the district court with jurisdiction but found 
for the judge on the merits,17 and one suggests the judge was acting m4risterially 
under a valid state law.18 Three circuits, altogether, find liability;19 four 
circuits, no liability.20 The Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit recognize a 
possible liability, while the Fifth Circuit suggests it will not apply the act.21 
A possible means of finding civil liability, apart from the Civil Rights Act, is 
suggested by judicial language that immunity does not apply to a judge acting 
entirely without jurisdiction.22 A judge acting in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment acts without authority.23 In answer to the argument that imposing 
such civil liability would allow federal control of state courts,24 it should be 
pointed out that only in the case of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
could any federal remedy be given,25 and federal courts already have the power 
of review in such cases.26 Moreover, the wording of the act does not exempt 
state judges from its operation;27 but this in itself is not conclusive, since there 
is similarly no express exemption of state legislators and yet the Supreme Court 
has recently said that Congress did not mean to destroy the legislators' historic 
immunity.28 Nevertheless, there seems a tendency for lower courts to place 
judges within the scope of the Civil Rights Act. Against the fear that the 
judiciary will be less able to give considered judgments must be weighed the 
injury to litigants from unconstitutional judgments. The scales have not yet 
tipped decisively one way or the other. 
John C. Hall, S.Ed. 
14 Viles v. Symes, (10th Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 828; Allen v. Biggs, (D.C. Pa. 1945) 
62 F. Supp. 229; Gregoire v. Biddle, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 579. 
15 Cooke v. Bangs, Jr., (8th Cir. 1887) 31 F. 640; United States to the use of Kinney 
v. Bell, (3d Cir. 1905) 135 F. 336. 
16 Green v. Elbert, (8th Cir. 1894) 63 F. 308. 
17 Mitchell v. Greenough, (9th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 184. 
18 Blackman v. Stone, (7th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 500. 
19 Note 13 supra. 
20 Souther v. Reid, (D.C. Va. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 806; Bottone v. Lindsley, note 11 
supra; United States v. Chaplin, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 926; and the principal case. 
21 Gregoire v. Biddle, note 14 supra; Blackman v. Stone, note 18 supra; McGuire v. 
Todd, (5th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 60, cert. den. 344 U.S. 835, 72 S.Ct. 44 (1952). 
22 Bradley v. Fisher, note 2 supra. , 
23 Grove v. Van Duyn, note 5 supra; McShane v. Moldovan, note 13 supra. 
24 See McGuire v. Todd, note 21 supra. 
25 Ex parte Virginia, note 9 supra. Mere error does not violate due process. Shemaitis 
v. Reid, (7th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 119. 
26 Tinsley v. Anderson, note 10 supra. 
27 Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., note 11 supra. 
28 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783 (1951). 
